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tion of a statute prohibiting the carrying of firearms concealed on or about the
person, there must be proof that the firearm is carried in such a manner as to
give no notice of its presence, and in such proximity of the accused as to be with-
in his easy reach and under his control and we find the courts of Missouri lenient
in determining what constitutes such proof. D. C. J. '28.
HOmEsTEAD-OwNER OF A HOMESTEAD INTEREST Is Nor ENTITLED TO OIL PRO-
DUCED FROM THE LAND.-A widow, having a homestead interest in land filed this
action to restrain the appellee oil company taking oil from land under a lease
executed by the children of the deceased. Held, that the widow was not en-
titled to oil produced or the proceeds thereof, nor to take over and operate the
wells during the continuance of the homestead interest, in view of the fact that
her right was merely to the use of the surface of the land. Brandenburg v.
Petroleum Exploration et al., (Ky. 1927) 291 S. W. 757.
It seems as if the entire decision is predicated upon the construction of the
Kentuckk Statutes (Sec.) 1707 which provides that homestead rights do not
create an estate in land, but only give owner of homestead the right to occupy
and use it, free from disturbance by heirs, creditors or others. This, however,
is not the general law throughout the country. The courts of Missouri hold that
an homestead interest is a life estate. In West v. McMullen, 112 Mo. 406, 1. c.
411, the court said, "We think the statute vested in the widow and minor chil-
dren, if any, an estate for her life, and during their minority, and not a mere
right of occupancy. Decisions upon statutes essentially different from ours
throw no light upon the question. But our own decisions and those of the
Vermont courts and of New Hampshire, under the act of 1868, determine that
the homestead is a life estate in land, and not a mere exemption dependent
upon occupancy, and being a vested life estate, the widow may use or rent it
out as she may see fit during her life. Rockhey v. Rockhey, 97 Mo. 76; Freund
v. McCall, 73 Mo. 343; Lake v. Page, 63 N. H. 318; Skouten v. Wood, 57 Mo.
380; Day v. Adams, 42 Vt. 516. Again in Bushnell v. Loomis, 243 Mo. 371, 1. c.
385, the court said, "Our own cases recognize that after the death of the hus-
band and the right of homestead has thereby become consummate, then the
wife's right rises to the dignity of an interest or estate in land. West v. Mc-
Mullen, 112 Mo. 1. c. 411, Hufschmidt v. Gross, 112 Mo. 1. c. 656. Home-
stead as well as dower are both life estates."
Some of the decisions in other states go further than the Mo. decisions. In
the case of Smith v. Shrieves, 13 Nev. 303 the court in construing the homestead
law of that state held that the surviving spouse had a fee simple estate. To the
same effect are the following cases: In re Bailard, 178 Cal. 293, 173 P. 170;
Rawlins v. Dade Lumber Co., 80 Fla. 398, 86 S. 334 where the court was of the
opinion that the surviving spouse took absolutely all the estate or interest that
was vested in the deceased homesteader in the homestead property at the time of
his death.
After a review of the various decisions of the different states the rule that
should be followed in regard to the homestead laws is best stated in 29 Corpus
Juris 783 wherein it is said, "The homestead interest depends entirely on organic
or statutory provisions nothing like it being known at common law; and there
can of course be no greater right in the homestead property than is created by
these provisions. Because of the difference in the wording of the homestead
laws in the various jurisdictions, the interest created thereby differs widely.
M. W. S. '29.
LOTTERIES-EFFECT ON COLLATERAL TRANSACTIoN-BAILMENT OF PRIZE BY WIN-
rER.-Plaintiff held a ticket entitling its holder to participate in a drawing for
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an automobile. She intrusted this ticket to the defendant with instructions to
inform her if her ticket won the prize. The ticket did in fact contain the win-
ning number, and the defendant, presenting it, claimed and received the auto-
mobile. On defendant's refusal to deliver to plaintiff the automobile so
acquired, this suit in replevin was brought. Held, that defendant under these
circumstances took possession of the automobile as bailee of the plaintiff, and he
cannot defeat the plaintiff's right to the car by showing that it was secured by a
lottery in violation of the law. Matta v. Katsoulas, (Wis. 1927) 212 N. W. 261.
In the principal case the law implies an agreement to redeliver; i. e., an obli-
gation to account to the plaintiff for the automobile won with her ticket. As
said in Burns v. State, 145 Wis. 373; 128 N. W. 987, 1. c. 990, "It is the element
of lawful possession, however created, and duty to accbunt for the thing as the
property of another that creates the bailment, regardless of whether such pos-
session is based on contract in the ordinary sense or not." See, to the same
effect, Foulke v. N. Y. Consol. Ry. Co., 228 N. Y. 269, 127 N. E. 237; Leonard v.
Co. v. Amer. Exp. Co., 216 Mo. App. 561, 260 S. W. 129.
The Wisconsin court's decision that defendant could not defend this action
on the ground of the illegality of the lottery in which the automobile was won is
amply supported by authority. See Kiewert v. Rindskopf, 46 Wis. 481, 1 N. W.
163; Gipson v. Knard, 96 Ala. 419, 11 So. 482; Brady v. Horvath, 167 Ill. 610, 47
N. E. 757; Catts v. Phalen & Morris, 2 How. (U. S.) 376; Martin v. Richard-
son, 94 Ky. 183, 21 S. W. 1039; Dee v. Sears-Nattinger Auto. Co., 141 Ia. 610,
118 N. W. 529. While a party to a contract may defend on its illegality, a third
person who is a stranger to that contract may not invoke such a defense.
Owens v. Davenport, 39 Mont. 555, 104 P. 682, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 966; Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co., 239 S. W. 919; Kiewert v. Rinds-
kopf, supra; Gipson v. Knard, supra; Brady v. Horvath, supra. The test upon
which each case is to be decided is whether the action is based upon the illegal
contract or one connected with and in furtherance of it, in which case the plain-
tiff must lose, Hill v. Ruggles, 56 N. Y. 424; Hooker v. DePalos, 28 Oh. St. 251;
Atkinson Novelty Co. v. E. L. Prince & Son, 28 Ga. App. 497, 111 S. E. 699;
Grove Mfg. Co. v. Jacobs, 117 Me. 163, 103 A. 14; or upon some separate and
distinct transaction, unaffected by the illegal contract, in which case he may suc-
ceed, Canfield Mfg. Co. v. Paddock, 96 Vt. 41, 116 A. 115; Rothrock v. Perkinson,
61 Ind. 39; Perkins v. Clemm, 23 Ark. 221. In some cases this criterion has been
expressed as follows: The party seeking a recovery may succeed when he can
make out his case otherwise than through the medium of an illegal transaction,
Roselle v. Beckemeier, 134 Mo. 380, 35 S. W. 1132; if a plaintiff requires any aid
from an illegal transaction to establish his demand, he cannot recover it,
Phalen v. Clark, 19 Conn. 421; Martin v. Hodge, 47 Ark. 378, 1 S. W. 694; if a
plaintiff can show a complete cause of action without having to prove his own
illegal act, he should get judgment, Woolf v. Bernero, 14 Mo. App. 418. And
plaintiff's action will not be defeated because an illegal transaction is shown by
the evidence, if such evidence is introduced simply to provide an .historical
background for the cause of action, complete without it. Phalen v. Clark,. supra,
and other cases cited. Moreover, plaintiff's prior illegal acquisition of title can-
not excuse defendant's present wrongful detention of the automobile. The law
must not let a bailee wrong his bailor merely because the bailor has broken the
law. As was said by the Court in Woolf v. Bernero, supra, a suit to recover the
value of a chattel lost negligently by a bailee intrusted with it for the purpose of
a raffle: "Plaintiffs are not deprived by law of their property in the diamond
because they deposited it with defendant for the purposes of an illegal raffle."
See also Gipson v. Knard, supra. In addition, it is a well settled principle of
agency that an agent cannot defend in an action for money belonging to his
principal on the ground that the principal acquired the property as the result
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol12/iss4/11
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
of a illegal transaction or intrusted it to the agent for an illegal purpose.
Nave v. Wilson, 12 Ind. A. 38, 38 N. E. 876; Clarke, Harrison & Co. v. Brown,
77 Ga. 606; Munns v. Donovan Comm. Co., 117 Ia. 516, 91 N. W. 789; Morgan
v. Groff, 4 Barb. (N. Y.) 524. No question of par delictum could possibly enter
into the principal case to defeat the plaintiff's action, as in Garland v. Isbell, 139
Ga. 64, 76 S. E. 591, which was a suit to determine which of the parties was the
rightful winner of a lottery prize. A comparison between that case and Mar-
tin v. Hodge, supra, brings out well the distinction between a suit in which
plaintiff relies upon the lottery to make out his case and an action in which he
makes out cause of action without reference to the lottery. R. L. A. '29.
MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcT-AcCIDENTAL INJURY
SUFFERED IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT.-The Workmen's Compensation Act
of Illinois provides compensation for "accidental injuries or death suffered in
the course of employment." A young girl, employed in a factory in the city
of Westville, Illinois, contracted typhoid fever, and died as a result of the ill-
ness. From fifteen to thirty girls employed in the same factory were treated
at the time for typhoid fever and the weight of evidence established that the
deceased had contracted the disease through the medium of drinking water
furnished in the factory. The parents of the girl were awarded compensation
for her death by an arbitrator, the award was affirmed by the Industrial Com-
mission. Held, the ruling of the commission was correct, and the death resulted
from "an accidental injury suffered in the course of employment." Rissman &
Son v. Ind. Commission, 323 Ill. 459, 154 N. E. 203.
Both English and American decisions recognize the fact that there are cer-
tain acts necessary to the life, comfort, and convenience of the servant while at
work, which, though strictly personal to himself, are incidental to the service,
and an injury sustained in the performance of such an act is deemed to have
arisen "in the course of employment" Hence, injuries occasioned while the
employee was preparing to eat lunch have been compensated. Clem v. Chalmers
Motor Co., 178 Mich. 340; Blouss v. Delaware, L. & W. Ry. Co., 73 Pa. Super.
Ct. 95; Haller v. City of Lansing, 195 Mich. 753. Also injuries incurred while
the servant attempted to care for his own comfort are suffered in the course of
employment. Benson v. Bush, 104 Kan. 198; Evans v. The Peterson, 28 Times
L. R. 18. An indulgence in tobacco, satisfying a natural want, should be
necessarily contemplated by the employer, and an injury incidental to such an
act occurs in the course of employment. Whiting-Mead Commercial Co. v. In-
dustrial Accident Commission, 178 Cal. 505; Dzikowska v. Superior Steel Co.,
259 Pa. 578; Springer v. North, 200 N. Y. S. 248; Kaletha v. Hall Mercantile
Co., 157 Minn. 290. A workman injured while washing in preparation to go
home after his day of work can recover compensation. Hollenbach Co. v. Hol-
lenbach, 181 Ky. 262. Stopping work to take a drink of water is incidental to
the employment. In re Osterbrink, 229 Mass. 407; Gililand v. Edgar Zinc Co.,
112 Kan. 39; Widdell Co. v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 180 Wis. 179;
Archibald v. Ott, 77 W. Va. 448. Other cases involving personal incidental
services to the same effect are Zabriskia v. Erie Ry. Co., 85 N. J. L. 157; Weldon
v Skinner & Eddy Corp., 103 Wash. 243; Morris v. Lambeth, 22 Times L. R.
22, and Leach v. Oakley Co. (1911), 1 K. B. 523. In the light of such decisions,
many of which were decided under identical statutes, the Illinois Court was
certainly justified in holding that the injury to the deceased occurred "in the
course of employment."
The troublesome question concerning the case under discussion is whether
the contraction of typhoid germs through drinking water is an "accidental in-
jury" under the Act. A prior Illinois decision, Christ v. Pacific Mutual Life
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